Introduction
In many bargaining situations (e.g., international trade negotiations and firm union wage bargaining) the bargainers often take actions prior to, andÂor during, the negotiation (offer counteroffer) process that partially commit them to some strategically chosen bargaining positions. Such commitments are partial in that they are revocable, but revoking a partial commitment can be costly for a bargainer. In his brilliant essay on bargaining (Schelling [6] ), Thomas Schelling informally examined the role, feasibility, and pervasiveness of this type of tactic in bargaining situations. The following two extracts from Schelling [6] illustrate this``commitment'' tactic:
only that the management could pay 82 but even perhaps that the negotiators themselves are incompetent if they fail to obtain close to 82. The purpose ... is to make clear to the management that the negotiators could not accept less than 82 even if they wished to because they no longer control the members or because they would lose their own positions if they tried. In other words, the negotiators reduce the scope of their own authority and confront the management with the threat of a strike that the union itself cannot avert, even though it was the union's own action that eliminated its power to prevent the strike ... [p. 27] When national representatives go to international negotiations knowing that there is a wide range of potential agreement within which the outcome will depend on bargaining, they seem often to create a bargaining position by public statements, statements calculated to arouse a public opinion that permit no concessions to be made. [p. 28] This paper aims to provide a formal game-theoretic analysis of the strategic effect of the commitment tactic on the bargaining outcome. To achieve this objective, we construct a simple bargaining game that captures the essence of the strategic role of the commitment tactic. The analysis of this game then allows us to formally explore the impact of this type of tactic on the bargaining outcome.
With the exception of the insightful work by Vincent Crawford (see Crawford [4] ) there exist hardly any formal game-theoretic bargaining models that explore the effect of the various tactics employed by bargainers on the bargaining outcome. Yet these often quite visible tactics lie at the center stage of many bargaining processes. It is indeed important to understand and study the influence of such tactics on the efficiency of the bargaining outcome and on the players' equilibrium shares of the``cake.'' Our model abstracts from the (potentially rich) processes and mechanisms by means of which the bargainers are able to partially commit themselves to some strategically chosen bargaining positions. For example, pledging one's``reputation'' could be a potent means of partial commitment. The two extracts from Schelling (stated above) illustrate various other mechanisms by means of which partial commitments can be made. The model studied in this paper should be interpreted as a reduced form of more detailed extensive-form models in which the sources of the costs of revoking are explicitly modelled.
Formally, our bargaining model is a one-shot, simultaneous-move game. Each bargainer makes a partial commitment (a share of the cake that she would like to get), which can later be revoked at some cost to the player. The players' payoffs (when the partial commitments are incompatible) are defined by the Nash bargaining solution, where a player's partial commitment affects the shape of the feasible utility set to her advantage. We assume that the cost of revoking a partial commitment depends on the accepted share and on the partial commitment. For example, the cost could depend on the difference between the partial commitment and the accepted share.
Under certain assumptions on the cost-of-revoking functions, we establish that our model possesses a unique Nash equilibrium. The uniqueness of the equilibrium implies that we have a theory of strategic bargaining, in that the tactical approach to bargaining adopted in the current paper does indeed resolve the fundamental indeterminacy of the bargaining situation. The properties of this equilibrium bargaining outcome, which we now highlight, inform us as to the nature of the influence and impact of thè`c ommitment'' tactic on the equilibrium partition of the unit size cake. The equilibrium is efficient in that neither player revokes her equilibrium partial commitment: each player's equilibrium share of the cake is exactly equal to her equilibrium partial commitment. A rather remarkable feature of the equilibrium partition of the unit size cake is that it depends only upon the relative magnitudes of the marginal costs to the players of revoking their respective equilibrium partial commitments; it is independent of other features of the cost-of-revoking functions. Moreover, it is shown that the equilibrium partition can be described by an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, in which a player's``bargaining power'' is a strictly increasing function of her marginal cost of revoking her partial commitment. Indeed, rather surprisingly, the higher a player's marginal cost of revoking her partial commitment, the bigger is the share of the cake received by the player.
An application of our model establishes a new, and rather compelling, equilibrium selection procedure in the Nash [5] demand game. The procedure is based on perturbing the commitment structure in the demand game, as against the informational structure which is the basis of the equilibrium selection procedures due to Nash [5] and Carlsson [3] . Besides selecting a unique equilibrium in the Nash demand game, our theory provides a neat interpretation of the indeterminacy (multiplicity of equilibria) in the Nash demand game. This paper has been inspired by Schelling's essay on bargaining. In addition, we have greatly benefitted from reading Crawford [4] , who also studies a model of bargaining based on the commitment tactic. However, Crawford's model and analysis are significantly different from ours.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the model. Then, in Section 3 we derive the unique Nash equilibrium with the assumption that the players' costs of revoking are linear. All of the intuition for the results in the main model, which are stated in Section 4, can be obtained here. Moreover, as the arguments are geometric, it is then easier to follow the formal analysis of the general model, which is relegated to the Appendix. We defer discussion of our results to Section 5, where we shall also discuss the role and applicability of the various assumptions that we make on the cost-of-revoking functions, thus providing some informal defence for interpreting our model as a reduced form. We conclude in Section 6 with some final remarks.
The Model
Two players, A and B, bargain over the partition of a unit size cake according to the following one-shot (static) game. They simultaneously and independently choose numbers from the closed interval [0, 1]. Let z i denote the number chosen by player i (i=A, B). The interpretation is that player i takes``actions'' which partially commit her not to accept a share strictly less than z i . A partial commitment can later be revoked at some cost to the player. We now turn to a description of the players' payoffs, where we denote player i 's payoff from a strategy pair z=(z A , z B ) by P i (z).
Payoffs When the Partial Commitments Are Compatible
First we describe the payoffs when the chosen partial commitments z A and z B are such that z A +z B 1. In this case we assume that neither of the two players will have to revoke their respective partial commitments: the share x i (0 x i 1) of the cake received by player i is such that x i z i . Thus, we assume that the share x i =* i (z), where * A and * B are any functions such that * A (z) z A and * B (z)=1&* A (z) z B . (For example,
, where 6 i (x i ) is the utility from obtaining a share x i of the cake. We shall make the following (standard) assumptions on 6 i .
(A1) For each i(i=A, B), the function 6 i : [0, 1] Ä R is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we set 6 i (0)=0 and 6 i (1)=1.
Payoffs When the Partial Commitments Are Incompatible
The Nash bargaining solution will be applied to define the players' payoffs when z A +z B >1. If an agreement over the partition of the unit size cake is struck, then at least one of the players must revoke her partial commitment. If player i receives a share x i (0 x i 1) of the unit size cake, then her utility is 6 i (x i )&C i (x i , z i ), where C i (x i , z i ) denotes the cost of revoking her partial commitment z i and (instead) obtaining a share x i . Clearly, C i =0 if x i z i , but if x i <z i then C i >0. An example of such a cost-of-revoking function is C i =max[0, k i (z i &x i )], where k i >0. Our results, however, hold for any C i that satisfies the following assumptions (the role and applicability of these assumptions are discussed in Section 5.5).
it is strictly decreasing, convex, and twice continuously differentiable in x i on the interval (0, z i ); (ii) for each 0 x i <1, it is strictly increasing, convex, and twice continuously differentiable in z i on the interval (x i , 1); and (iii) for each 0<z i 1, the left-hand derivative of C i w.r.t. x i , evaluated at x i =z i , is strictly negative and is independent of the value of z i (i.e., there exists a constant k i >0 such that for any 0<z i 1,
The payoff pair (P A (z), P B (z)), when z A +z B >1, will be defined as the Nash bargaining solution computed with the set 8(z) of feasible utility pairs that can be the outcome of bargaining, which is constructed using the set X of feasible partitions of the unit size cake and the utility functions 
, the set 8(z) is the graph of the function F( } ; z) defined by
where the domain and range of F( } ; z) are the closed intervals [ &C A (0, z A ), 1] and [ &C B (0, z B ), 1], respectively. Given A1 and A2 it Figure 1 follows that, for each pair z, F( } ; z) is bijective, concave, and strictly decreasing in u A . We shall shortly illustrate the relationship between the feasible set 8(z) and the partial commitments z A and z B .
It is possible (but not necessary) that there exist values of z A and z B such that F(0; z) 0. In such a case, player i's payoff P i (z)=0 (i=A, B). However, when F(0; z)>0, then we define
s.t. u B =F(u A ; z). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the feasible set 8(z) and the pair of partial commitments z=(z A , z B ), where z A +z B >1, in the simplest possible case (i.e., with linear utilities): for any 0
An Example: The Linear Model
The line segment RS depicts the set X of feasible partitions of the unit size cake, while the graph TNQM depicts the feasible set 8(z). If the partition lies on the line segment RV (resp., WS), then it is only player A (resp., B) who is revoking her partial commitment. But if the partition lies in the interior of the line segment VW, then both players are revoking their respective partial commitments. In this latter case, u A =x A &k A (z A &x A ) and u B =x B &k B (z B &x B ). Consider, for example, the partition depicted by point a. The utility to player A will be the``x-coordinate'' of point c, while the utility to player B will be the``y-coordinate'' of point b. Hence, this defines the utility pair (point d) associated with such a partition.
It is straightforward to show that the line segments TW, VM, and NQ are defined by the respective equations
(1)
In Section 3, the slopes of these equations will play an important role. Note that these slopes are independent of z A and z B .
In the next section, we derive the unique Nash equilibrium for the linear model. All of the intuition behind the results for the main model (satisfying A1 and A2) can be obtained from the study of this linear case. In particular, as most of our arguments will be geometric, it is then easier to comprehend the more formal analysis underlying the main model.
Nash Equilibrium in the Linear Model
This section investigates the Nash equilibria with the assumption that, for each i=A, B,
Proof. Straightforward, since if z A +z B <1, then there will exist an i (i=A or B) such that 1&z j >* i (z); for otherwise, * A (z) 1&z B and * B (z) 1&z A imply that z A +z B 1. Hence, player i can benefit from a unilateral deviation to z i $=1&z j . K Lemma 2. If z A +z B >1, then z=(z A , z B ) cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that F(0; z)>0. 1 The argument, by contradiction, is as follows (allowing for the roles of A and B being reversed).
2 Suppose P B (z)<z B (i.e., in Fig. 1 , the payoff pair (P A (z), P B (z)) lies either in the interior of the line segment NQ or on the line segment QM). We shall argue that player B can benefit from a decrease in her partial commitment to z$ B =z B &= for some = such that 0<=<z B . Consider Proof. By contradiction. Suppose z B Âz A >(1+k B )Â(1+k A ). We shall show that player A can benefit from an increase in her partial commitment to z$ A =z A += for some = such that 0<=<1&z A . Consider Fig. 3 . The graph TNQM depicts the feasible set 8(z$), where z$=(z$ A , z B ). The slope of the line segment NQ is equal to &(1+k B )Â(1+k A ). Hence, by continuity, it follows that there will exist an 0<=<1&z A such that the slope of the ray OQ is (also) strictly greater than (1+k B )Â(1+k A ). Consequently, P A (z$) z$ A , i.e., P A (z$)>z A .
A symmetric argument establishes that if z B Âz A <(1+k B )Â(1+k A ), then player B can benefit from an increase in her partial commitment. K
We are now ready to derive the unique Nash equilibrium for the linear model. Proof. Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 imply that if a pair z=(z A , z B ) is in a Nash equilibrium, then z A +z B =1 and (z B Âz A )=(1+k B )Â(1+k A ), i.e., the pair (z A , z B ) is as defined in the proposition. We shall now establish that, in fact, this pair is in a Nash equilibrium. First, suppose player A unilaterally deviates to z$ A =z A +=, where 0<= 1&z A . The graph TNQM, in Fig. 3 , depicts the feasible set 8(z$), where z$=(z$ A , z B ). Since the slope of the line segment NQ is equal to &(1+k B )Â(1+k A ), it follows that the payoff pair (P A (z$), P B (z$)) will be at the point G that lies on the ray OV. Hence, the deviation is not profitable. Second, it is straightforward to show that player A cannot benefit from a unilateral deviation to any 0 z$ A <z A . Finally, by a symmetric argument it follows that player B cannot benefit from a unilateral deviation to a partial commitment z$ B {z B . K We shall defer the discussion of this result until after we establish, formally, a similar result in the main model. In particular, further intuition and interpretation of this result is provided in Section 5.4, where we shall use this result to understand the cause of the indeterminacy in the Nash
Nash Equilibrium in the General Model
This section shows how our results generalise when 6 i and C i satisfy A1 and A2, respectively. The proofs can be found in the Appendix. The first result here, Proposition 2, establishes the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, and provides a characterisation of this equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness and Characterisation). If, for each i (i=A, B), 6 i and C i satisfy A1 and A2, respectively, then the bargaining model has at most a unique Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the players' partial commitments z* A and z* B constitute the unique solution to z A +z B =1 and
This unique equilibrium is very similar to that derived in the linear model. In fact, if 6 i is linear and C i satisfies A2, then the equilibrium is exactly the same. Indeed, a key (and rather interesting) feature of the equilibrium partial commitments is that they depend only on the players' marginal costs, k A and k B (cf. A2(iii)), of revoking their respective partial commitments.
We now turn to the issue of the existence of this unique Nash equilibrium. It turns out that the equilibrium exists provided the degree of convexity of the cost-of-revoking function C i (i=A, B) is sufficiently small. (In the Appendix, we construct a simple example to show that this unique equilibrium does not exist if the degree of convexity of C i is sufficiently large.) In order to establish our existence result, Proposition 3 below, we need to employ two further assumptions on C i (in addition to A2), which are stated below in A3. In words, A3 states that, for any pair (x i , z i ) such that x i <z i , (i) the increase in the cost C i (x i , z i ) as x i is decreased at the margin is equal to the increase in this cost as z i is increased at the margin, and (ii) the increase in the marginal cost &C 1 i (x i , z i ) as x i is decreased at the margin is greater than or equal to the increase in this marginal cost as z i is increased at the margin.
(A3) For each i (i=A, B) and for any pair (x i , z i ) such that x i <z i :
These two assumptions embody the notion that x i and z i are to be treated symmetrically in the cost function C i . For example, if the cost of revoking z i and obtaining x i <z i is a (possibly non-linear) function of the difference z i &x i , then A3 will be satisfied. A simple example of a convex cost function satisfying A2 and A3 is C i =0 if x i z i , and C i =k i (z i &x i )+ ($ i Â2)(z i &x i ) 2 if x i <z i , where k i >0 and $ i 0.
Proposition 3 (Existence). If, for each i (i=A, B), 6 i satisfies A1, C i satisfies A2 and A3, and, for any pair
, then the unique Nash equilibrium described in Proposition 2 does exist.
Therefore, if the``degree of convexity,'' C 11 i , of the cost function C i (i=A, B) is strictly less than (k i ) 2 Â6 i (z i *), then the unique equilibrium does exist. Consider, for example, the following function: C i =0 if x i z i , and if
2 , where k i >0 and $ i 0. And assume that
2 (2+k i +k j )]Â(1+k i ) (where i{j), then the unique equilibrium does exist. Notice that this bound on $ i is strictly increasing in k i (and in k j ), and it converges to plus infinity as either k i or k j or both k i and k j converge to plus infinity. Clearly, therefore, for a large class of convex cost functions satisfying A2 and A3 the unique Nash equilibrium, described in Proposition 2, does exist.
Discussion
Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 state, and comment upon, some of the main properties of the unique Nash equilibrium, which is described in Proposition 2. Then, in Section 5.4, we show that our model can be applied to select a unique equilibrium in Nash's demand game. Section 5.5 contains a brief discussion of A2, the assumptions made on the cost-of-revoking function C i . In Section 5.6 we argue that our results would not change if player A were to choose her partial commitment after observing player B's partial commitment. Finally, in Section 5.7 we point out that our results are (also) robust to a modification in the payoff rule.
Efficiency
In equilibrium neither player revokes her partial commitment. Naturally, the complete information assumption must be crucial in establishing this feature of the equilibrium. It would be interesting to analyze our model with the assumption that a player's marginal cost k i of revoking a partial commitment is her private information. We suspect that there may then exist an equilibrium in which some player does revoke her partial commitment.
Comparative Statics
The equilibrium share of the cake to a player depends only upon k A and k B , the marginal costs to the players of revoking their respective partial commitments. It is independent of other features of the cost-of-revoking functions. For example, it is independent of the degrees of convexity in these functions.
Player i 's equilibrium share is strictly increasing in k i , and strictly decreasing in k j . Thus, if a high k i is interpreted as a weak bargaining position for player i (as indeed one's intuition a priori would suggest), then our model supports the viewpoint that, in bargaining, weakness can often be a source of strength (cf., e.g., Schelling [6] ).
Nash Program
If and only if 6$ i (z i *)=1 (for both i=A and B), the equilibrium partition of the unit size cake (x A , x B )=(z* A , z* B ) can be described by an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution computed with the feasible utility set [(6 A (x A ), 6 B (x B )): 0 x A , x B 1 and x A +x B =1],``disagreement point'' (0, 0), and``bargaining powers'' { A =1+k A and { B =1+k B .
Equilibrium Selection in the Nash Demand Game
The Nash demand game (see [5] ) possesses a continuum of Nash equilibria. By perturbing the informational structure of his demand game, John Nash was able to select a unique equilibrium (see Binmore [1 and 2] and van Damme [7] for a thorough discussion of Nash's equilibrium selection procedure). For an alternative, but related, equilibrium selection procedure see Carlsson [3] .
At the heart of the Nash demand game lies the assumption that the bargainers can make irrevocable commitments to their respective demands. Our model may be interpreted as a perturbation to the commitment structure of the Nash demand game, where this perturbation is made arbitrarily small in the limit as both k A and k B diverge to plus infinity.
It follows from Proposition 2 that in the limit, as k A Ä + and k B Ä + , keeping the ratio k A Âk B constant at some value #>0, the unique equilibrium partial commitments (or demands) will depend on the value of #. For example, if 6 i (x i )=x i , then, in this limit, z* A Ä #Â(1+#) and z* B Ä 1Â(1+#). This result, besides selecting a unique equilibrium in the Nash demand game, provides an interpretation of the indeterminacy (multiplicity of equilibria) in the demand game: the ratio k A Âk B is an important determinant of the equilibrium demands, but is undetermined in Nash's demand game (since, in the demand game, k A = + and k B = + ).
It is interesting to note that these results are analogous to the results obtained in Rubinstein's alternating-offers bargaining model: if the players' rates of time preference, r A and r B , are such that r A =r B =0, then the model has a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria, but if r A >0 and r B >0, then there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and moreover, in the limit as r A Ä 0 and r B Ä 0, the unique equilibrium partition depends on the ratio r A Âr B . By studying the limiting model (k A Ä + and k B Ä + ), rather than the model at the limit (k A =k B = + ), one discovers the significant role played by the ratio k A Âk B . In fact, it is rather intuitive that in order to generate a unique (equilibrium) partition, one needs to know how``strong'' player A is relative to player B. Since this question cannot be addressed when k A =k B = + , it is not surprising that therefore every partition can be supported as an equilibrium in the Nash demand game.
Comments on Some of the Assumptions
The continuity and monotonicity assumptions on C i capture the notion that the cost to player i of revoking her partial commitment z i and obtaining a share x i <z i depends on the amount by which she revokes (deviates from) her partial commitment (e.g., on the difference z i &x i ). Consider, for example, wage bargaining between a union leader and management. If the cost to the union leader of revoking a partial commitment depends on her expected loss of reputation (credibility) and on the probability of her being fired from the post of union leader, then it may seem reasonable to assume that the cost is continuous in the difference z i &x i (cf., e.g., the extracts from Schelling that were stated in Section 1).
The assumption that the marginal cost &C 1 i (z i &; z i ) of revoking a partial commitment is strictly positive is quite reasonable. However, let me emphasize that this assumption plays a fundamental role in our analysis and results. (The kinks in the graphs of the feasible sets are created by this assumption.) In fact, if both players' marginal costs were equal to zero, then almost any pair of partial commitments can be supported in equilibrium.
The assumption that the marginal cost &C 1 i (z i &; z i ) of revoking a partial commitment is independent of the value of the partial commitment seems reasonable, especially since there appear to be no good (or compelling) reasons to suggest otherwise. Indeed, why would it be relatively easier (i.e., less costly) to revoke, at the margin, moderate (or extreme) partial commitments. Let me, nevertheless, briefly discuss whether and how our results would be affected by any alternative assumption describing the dependence of the marginal cost &C Finally, note that the differentiability assumptions on C i (and on 6 i ) have been made to simplify the analysis and the exposition. Our results can be obtained without such assumptions, especially since the concavity in 6 i &C i does ensure differentiability almost everywhere.
No First-Mover Advantage
How would the results obtained in this paper change if player A were to choose her partial commitment z A after observing the partial commitment z B chosen by player B? Would player B benefit from being the``firstmover''? We now sketch an argument which will establish that the outcome is, in fact, unaffected: that is, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium partial commitments (in the sequential-move structure) are identical to the unique Nash equilibrium partial commitments (in the simultaneous-move structure). Our argument (and therefore this conclusion) is for the linear utilities case.
The argument below will exploit our main result, namely that the simultaneous-move (linear) model has a unique Nash equilibrium (z* A , z* B ), as stated in Proposition 1, with the property that z* B Âz* A =K, where K=(1+k B )Â(1+k A ).
If z B <z* B , then z B Â(1&z B )<K. It can therefore be verified, using geometric arguments (similar to those contained in the proofs to Lemmas 2 and 3 and Proposition 1), that player A's unique best response is to set z A =1&z B . Now suppose that player B chooses z B >z* B . This implies that z B Â(1&z B )>K. It can therefore be verified, again using geometric arguments, that player A's unique best response is to set z A equal to the unique solution of the following equation: F(z A ; z)Âz A =K, where z= (z A , z B ). With linear utilities, F(z A ; z)=[(1+k B )(1&z A )&k B z B ]. Hence, player A's unique best response to a z B >z* B is z A =[1+k B (1&z B )]Â K(2+k A ). For each z B >z* B player B's payoff will equal F(z A ; z) with z A being player A's unique best response to z B . Straightforward computation, therefore, establishes that player B's optimal choice is z* B .
The result obtained here re-enforces a main message of this paper: the equilibrium partial commitments chosen by the players depend critically (and only) on the relative magnitudes of the marginal costs to the players of revoking their respective partial commitments. Even the order in which the players make their respective partial commitments does not matter.
On the Payoff Rule
We have assumed that if the players' partial commitments are compatible (z A +z B 1), then neither player will have to revoke their respective partial commitment. It may, however, be reasonable (in some contexts) not to make this assumption. In that case one can define the players' payoffs using the Nash bargaining solution, as we did if z A +z B >1. With such a change in the rule that defines the payoffs, our results are unaffected: Propositions 1 3 still describe the unique Nash equilibrium. 5 
Concluding Remarks
This paper has explored the influence of a particular type of tactic on the outcome of bargaining situations. Of course, we are far from a complete understanding of this bargaining tactic. Much more research is required, and the interested reader is advised to consult Schelling [6] and Crawford [4] for further discussion of the other issues involved.
We see some scope for further development and extension of the model studied in this paper, in order to increase and improve our understanding of commitment tactics in bargaining. One line of research could involve modifying the rules that define the payoffs, (for example, by choosing a different bargaining solution, and or by changing the assumptions on the structure of the costs of revoking). Another line of research could involve enlarging the strategy spaces (for example, by allowing the players to revise their respective partial commitments, with costs being incurred if they are revised downwards and, perhaps, benefits being obtained if revised upwards).
Proposition 3, we first derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the unique Nash equilibrium (Lemma 4A below). Finally, an example is constructed to show that the unique Nash equilibrium will not exist when the degree of convexity of the cost-of-revoking function C A is sufficiently large. . Furthermore, by writing g 1 (=) in terms of 6 i and C i (i=A and B), it is straightforward to verify that g 1 is also continuous on the interval [0, 1&P A (z)) (since 6 A and 6 B are continuously differentiable, C B is continuously differentiable in x B on (0, z B ), and C 1 A (z A &; z A )= &k A for any 0<z A 1). Hence, since f 1 (0)<g 1 (0), there will exist an 0<=<1&P A (z) such that f 1 (=)<g 1 (=). Consequently, by the concavity of F( }; z$(=)) in u A , it follows that P A (z$(=)) P A (z)+=, i.e., P A (z$(=))>P A (z). Proof. When i= A and j= B, inequality (5) can be rewritten as follows. For any 0<= 1&z* A , &F(6 A (z* A ); z**(=)) 6 A (z* A ) F 1 (6 A (z* A ); z**(=)),
Proof of Proposition
where z**(=)=(z* A +=, z* B ). It is now evident that for any 0<= 1&z* A , 6 A (z* A ) P A (z**(=)) if and only if inequality (6) is satisfied. Hence, since it is trivial to show that player A cannot benefit from a unilateral deviation to any 0 z A <z* A (given z B =z* B ), it follows that z* A is player A's best response to z* B if and only if inequality (6) 
